This article formalizes investor rationality and irrationality, exuberance and apprehension, to consider the implications of belief formation for the fragility of an economy's financial structure. The model presented generates a financial structure with portfolio linkages that make it susceptible to contagious financial crises, despite the absence of coordination failures. Investors forecast the likelihood of loss from contagion and may shift preemptively to safer portfolios, breaking portfolio linkages in the process. The entire financial structure collapses when the last group of investors reallocates their portfolios. If some investors are irrationally exuberant, the financial structure remains intact longer. In fact, financial collapse occurs sooner when almost all investors are rationally exuberant than when they are irrationally exuberant. Additionally, a financial crisis initiated by real shocks is indistinguishable from one caused solely by the presence of rationally apprehensive investors in a fundamentally sound economy. Policies that make portfolio linkages more resilient can improve welfare.
they use all the information available to them, including the true probability distributions of the economy's random variables, when forming expectations. The implication, of course, is that irrational, or boundedly rational, investors do not have rational expectations. 4 In particular, they are assumed to optimize, but to form expectations given their subjective, and incorrect, beliefs about the distributions governing random variables. The subjective priors assumed generate posterior beliefs that are the opposite of the beliefs held by rational investors.
The macroeconomics literature provides little guidance, however, regarding the modeling of exuberance. Dictionaries define "exuberance" as the state of being joyously unrestrained and enthusiastic. This definition is applied here by considering exuberant investors to be those who are very optimistic about the prospects for the economy and thus for their investment portfolios. To better isolate the effect of exuberance in financial markets, the implications of there being a fraction of investors who are not exuberant are also examined. These apprehensive investors, as they are called, perceive the economy's fundamentals as poor and so expect losses on their portfolios.
To model rationality, exuberance, and apprehension under these interpretations, this paper uses a variant of the model in Lagunoff and Schreft (1998) . That model consists of many projects that require funding to operate, and many investors who provide the necessary funds. The investors initially hold portfolios that are linked in the sense that an investor's expected and actual portfolio returns depend on the portfolio choices of other investors. Identically and independently distributed shocks to the projects' operations can cause some projects to fail initially. All investors know the probability of project failure and thus know the economy's fundamentals. Realized project failures break some portfolio linkages, which causes some investors to incur losses and reallocate their portfolios, thereby breaking additional linkages. The initial project failures thus spark a contagious financial crisis. Investors who foresee the crisis reducing their portfolio returns can protect themselves if desired by preemptively shifting to a portfolio that is safer in that it reduces their exposure to any ongoing contagion. Since all investors are identical, if one takes such preemptive action, then they all do, causing the instantaneous collapse of all remaining portfolio linkages, despite the absence of coordination failures. An economy is considered more fragile the earlier this total financial collapse occurs.
The model presented below in Section II departs from the Lagunoff and Schreft model in three critical respects. First, here the economy's fundamentals are uncertain in that the probability of project failure, the parameter that characterizes the iid stochastic process, is not known. This requires investors to form expectations about both the fundamentals and their exposure to contagion risk. Second, investors' information about the fundamentals comes from a noisy signal that they observe and use in forming their expectations. Since different investors can observe different signals, heterogeneous beliefs are possible here, in contrast to the Lagunoff and Schreft paper. This heterogeneity can apply to posterior beliefs about fundamentals, about other investors' beliefs, and about the representation of beliefs within the population. Finally, the equilibrium concept used here differs from that in Lagunoff and Schreft in a subtle way. In Lagunoff and Schreft the goal is to look at the inherent fragility of an economy, so the focus is on the set of equilibria that keeps the economy's financial structure intact the longest. As a device for finding such an equilibrium, investors are assumed to make relatively optimistic forecasts. That is, they foresee the possibility of contagion, but not of preemptive behavior. In contrast, in this paper investors make forecasts that account for the possibility of both contagion and total financial collapse.
Two variants of the economy are studied. The first, presented in Section III, takes investors to be rational as defined above and looks at fragility when the fundamentals are strong, so exuberance is justified. The second, which is the subject of Section IV, assumes irrationality and weak fundamentals. This organization is motivated by von Hayek's (1937) belief that "[B]efore we can explain why people commit mistakes, we must first explain why they should ever be right."
Several intriguing findings emerge. First, exuberant investors remain invested at least as long as their apprehensive counterparts, regardless of whether everyone is rational or irrational. As a result, the portfolio choices of the exuberant investors necessarily determine the date of total financial collapse, and thus the economy's fragility. But the presence of apprehensive investors also plays a critical role in determining fragility. An increase in the presence of apprehensive investors in the economy makes the economy at least as fragile. This too is true whether everyone is rational or irrational. And if there is at least one apprehensive investor in the economy, total financial collapse can occur, regardless of the fundamentals and the rationality of investors. This is the case even in an economy where all investors are rational and where the fundamentals are so strong that nothing in the physical environment ever sparks a contagion. The reason is rooted in the factors that generate apprehension. Investors who receive misleading information about the fundamentals, even if they know the true model of the economy (i.e., have the correct prior), perceive a contagious financial crisis as more likely than it actually is. Given this perception, they believe they benefit from reallocating their portfolios to preempt experiencing portfolio losses. This behavior by itself initiates a contagious financial crisis. The rationally exuberant investors in this economy correctly forecast that the fundamentals make financial crises unlikely, but must respond strategically to the portfolio reallocations they expect by the apprehensive investors. They choose to reallocate their own portfolios to protect themselves against losses due to the contagion the apprehensive investors initiate.
Interestingly, rationally exuberant investors who live in a fundamentally strong economy reallocate their portfolios sooner than irrationally exuberant investors who live in a fundamentally weak economy, which makes the strong economy the more fragile one. This finding stems from the effect of irrationality on beliefs. Investors who form expectations irrationally misforecast the behavior of other investors and thus misforecast the fundamentals by a larger margin than they would if all investors were identical. As a result, irrational investors' sentiments about the fundamentals are more extreme than those of rational investors.
These results have some disturbing implications for policymakers concerned about irrationality in financial markets. First, an economy with rationality is indistinguishable from one with irrationality in terms of the types of financial crises experienced. Thus, an observer looking at the realization of crises after the fact cannot tell whether the initial exuberance was rational or irrational. Second, an economy with sound fundamentals and rational investors experiences total financial collapse at the same date as some economy with particular weak fundamentals and identical investors who know those fundamentals. This is discouraging news because it means that a financial crisis that looks as if it were initiated by real shocks to the economy instead could have been caused solely by the presence of rational, but unjustifiably apprehensive, investors.
Section V discusses the implications of these findings for welfare and policy. Since all investors, whether rational or irrational, optimize, they are as well off as possible, conditional on the signals they observe and their beliefs. There will always be some, however, who regret their decisions. They are the ones who do not preemptively reallocate their portfolios in time to avoid incurring losses from contagion. To reduce the likelihood of such regrets, policymakers can try to eliminate contagion. A short-run policy option is for a lender of last resort to make loans to ensure that no project lacks sufficient funding to operate solely because of contagious portfolio reallocations. Section V explains that such a policy is problematic and ineffective because the model, as specified, requires that loans go to investors. At best, the policy can stop contagion for a period or two. Alternatively, if the model allowed for agents who operated the projects, loans could go to them instead. That approach, however, brings with it moral-hazard problems.
It remains an open question whether the benefits from such a lending policy exceed the costs.
In the long run, policies aimed at strengthening an economy's financial infrastructure can prove effective. Examples include programs to obtain information about existing portfolio linkages and to encourage diversification. Such policies reduce the likelihood of contagion by increasing the resiliency of portfolio linkages and reducing the cost to investors if links do break. These policies, like the lender-of-last-resort policy, must be implemented by an institution whose authority encompasses all portfolio linkages.
A natural question, given the model's results, is how this paper differs from the papers in the large literature on bubbles. A bubble is said to exist when the price of an asset is inconsistent with market fundamentals. In a narrow sense, then, the model presented here does not generate bubbles because its asset prices are fixed. In a broader sense, however, this model is about bubbles.
Bubbles arise when the demands for assets deviate from what is justified by market fundamentals, and such deviations in asset demands do occur in this model. When the demand for a project is sufficiently high, the project operates and pays a positive net return. But when the demand falls sufficiently, the project fails to operate, paying a zero return and having zero value thereafter.
When rational exuberance is the dominant sentiment, there is a period during which the demand for projects is lower than what market fundamentals dictate. Likewise, when irrational exuberance is prevalent, the demand for projects is sustained for a period of time beyond that justified by fundamentals. Yet there still exists a date, although possibly infinity, at which the mere anticipation of a sharp decline in the demand for some projects leads investors to dramatically reduce the demand for all projects, driving their values to zero. In this sense, then, this paper is consistent with the bubble literature.
II. The Economy
The model presented below is a variant of that in Lagunoff and Schreft that is more complex in one sense and less so in another. The added complexity derives from the differences in the models' state variables. In Lagunoff and Schreft, the focus was on defining and characterizing fragility and on assessing how fragility changes as an economy increases in size. Consequently, the size of the economy was a key state variable, and the economy's fundamentals were assumed known to all investors. In this paper, in contrast, the objective is to see if investment behavior is consistent with market fundamentals. As a result, the economy's size is fixed, but there is uncertainty about the fundamentals. Additionally, because different agents can observe different signals about the fundamentals, heterogeneous beliefs are possible. This means that agents must forecast not only the risk of loss associated with the various portfolios, but also the forecasts of other investors about investment risks. To offset some of this added complexity, the model presented here takes agents' initial portfolio allocations as exogenous. Lagunoff and Schreft show, however, that there exist economies for which the initial portfolios assumed here are held in equilibria of the type studied in both papers.
A. The Physical Environment
Time is discrete and represented by t = 0, 1, …. The economy consists of k investors, each endowed at date 0 with two units of an indivisible object known as dollars and with nothing at later dates. Investors can provide for future consumption by investing their dollars in one of the economy's safe or risky assets. Each investor has access to a safe asset that pays zero interest. He also has the option of investing in the economy's k risky projects, which offer the chance of a higher return.
Specifically, at each date a project yields a random return of R(I) dollars per dollar invested,
where I denotes the total number of dollars invested. Each project can be operated only if it has sufficient funding. For simplicity, the critical level of funding-the level at which a project operates and pays the maximum return per dollar, R -is taken to be $2. Projects that have less than two dollars invested in them pay a gross return per dollar of zero. Once a project has been insufficiently funded, it becomes inoperable at all future dates. When a project is overfunded, with more than two dollars invested in it, decreasing returns are realized and the project yields a return per dollar of 2 R /I.
At date 0 only, there is a second way by which a project can become inoperable:
independently and identically distributed shocks can cause projects to fail, pay a zero return, and permanently cease operation. The true probability of a project's failing from an exogenous shock is represented by the random variable ℘, which can take one of two values, either zero or p , where 0 < p ≤ 1. Once a project fails, it is forever inoperable. If a project succeeds at date 0, it pays a return that depends on the amount invested, as described above.
In summary, then, a project's return per dollar, assuming the project has not previously ceased operation, satisfies where R max > R > 1. The upper bound R max is imposed for simplicity and assumed to be such that no portfolio ever yields a dollar in interest, thus leaving investors with $3 to invest, and that no investor who sustains a loss of any magnitude ever reinvests in more than one project. Given that investors are initially endowed with $2 and that dollars are indivisible, the first condition implies that R < 1.5, while the second, which rules out an unusual situation for notational simplicity,
The state of the economy depends on which value of ℘ is realized. Without loss of generality, all investments are assumed to be for one period.
5 Brandenburger and Deckel (1990) discuss the role of common-knowledge assumptions. 6 The assumption that dollars are indivisible is equivalent to an assumption that investments must be made in $1 increments. Investors are assumed to know k, the number of projects available initially, when they choose their first portfolios. These portfolio choices, as well as all later ones, are assumed to be private information: investors know their own portfolio allocations, but not those of others. This assumption is made to capture the notion of large, anonymous economies. Investors also are assumed to have limited ability to communicate and thus to overcome the information restrictions to share risk. Since investors do not know the true state, these assumptions on information and communication imply that they also do not know the realization of shocks at date 0 or how many projects are left at any time after the shocks hit. They are aware, however, of the fate of the projects in which they have invested.
Figure 1 below, which illustrates the timing of economic activity, provides a summary of the physical environment just described. Investors begin date 0 with $2, which they invest in a portfolio of assets. They then observe a signal regarding the probability of the iid shocks being realized. Next, the shocks are realized, causing some projects to fail. If a project fails, the agents who invested in it lose their entire investment. After returns are realized, both at date 0 and at all later dates, investors choose how to divide their remaining wealth between current consumption and investment at the next date. This completes the description of the physical environment. While the shocks at date 0 initiate linkage breaks, fragility requires that there be a propagation mechanism that magnifies the effects of the shocks. In what follows, attention is restricted to economies in which such a propagation mechanism exists. More precisely, attention is restricted to economies in which, at each date t ≥ 0, an investor who has lost $1 prefers not to Al 1 lB n n4 2n
Dl lC The mix of chains that exists at any point in time represents the economy's chain structure-or financial structure. Since investors are assumed to hold maximum-return diversified portfolios initially, the date-0 chain structure consists solely of closed chains. Nothing in the model identifies the process that determines the initial chain structure. All investors, however, are assumed to know the true probability distribution over the possible chains in which they can find themselves before shocks hit. At any time after shocks are realized, the chain structure is a mix of closed and open chains, but only those chains that could have evolved from ones possible initially. 
i . Appendix A presents the expressions for these expected utilities for each possible state and each possible action an investor can take.
C. Equilibrium and Fragility
The preceding specification of strategies and forecasts implies symmetry in the strategies of investors of the same type. In what follows, then, only symmetric equilibria are studied, and they all share two features. First, as stated previously, to ensure the existence of a propagation mechanism that can permit small shocks to have large-scale effects, the economies studied have the property that investors who lose $1 do not reinvest in the chain structure. That is, in equilibrium, 
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The following definition captures these features of a symmetric equilibrium. ii. For each t,
iii. Investors start date 0 holding maximum-return diversified portfolios.
By construction, then, in a symmetric equilibrium there exists some first date at which investors of type i decide to switch from a diversified portfolio to the next-best alternative, which is necessarily safer in that it involves less exposure to contagion risk (fewer dollars at risk, or dollars at risk from contagion from fewer directions). And by the equilibrium's symmetry, if one investor of type i decides to reallocate his portfolio, then all investors of type i do so. The exit-decision date at which type i investors all decide to reallocate and thus exit, or disconnect from, the chain structure at the next opportunity, given ε, is denoted by τ i (ε).
The effect of ε on τ i (ε) is complicated because ε represents both an investor's uncertainty about the true probability of project failure at date 0 and his belief about the fraction of investors of each type. To sort out the effect of ε on τ i (ε), it proves useful to look at the exit-decision date in an economy in which all investors share the same beliefs and assign probability 1 to the event ℘ = p for some p > 0. This is exactly the Lagunoff and Schreft economy. In what follows, the exitdecision date for this economy with homogeneous beliefs and certainty about the fundamentals is denoted by τ p b g. By construction, it is the first date t for which The exit-decision date τ p ( ) is an equilibrium in pure strategies in the Lagunoff-Schreft economy with homogeneous beliefs of the type specified here. This equilibrium involves a two-action-best-response cycle between strategies U and S at the exit-decision date. There thus must exist an equilibrium in which investors use mixed strategies at the exitdecision date. It is conjectured, but not proven here, that for some preferences and parameter values, an equilibrium exists in pure strategies as well.
otherwise would have.
It follows that an economy may be characterized as more fragile the earlier the date at which its entire chain structure collapses (i.e., the earlier max b g can be zero, in which case the economy's chain structure collapses with certainty when investors reinvest at date 1, it also can be infinity, which means the economy never suffers a complete financial collapse due to strategic investor behavior.
A desirable feature of a maximal sustainable equilibrium is that it gives rise to a date of certain and complete financial collapse later than that of any other equilibrium. Lagunoff and Schreft introduce the concept because their goal is to assess the inherent fragility of an economy.
As a modeling device to find such an equilibrium, Lagunoff and Schreft assume that an investor makes an optimistic forecast-a forecast f i such that, for all t ≥ 0 and each type i = 1,2,
An investor with this forecast expects that other investors
continue to hold diversified and linked portfolios until they personally experience losses and then shift to safer portfolios. The optimistic forecast implies that investors foresee the contagious financial crisis initiated by shocks to projects, but not the preemptive behavior that instantaneously induces total collapse. In contrast, the equilibrium concept defined above assumes that investors make conditionally correct forecasts. Such forecasts arise when investors have foresight about both the contagious crisis and the preemptive behavior, and so are less optimistic than optimistic forecasts. These forecasts are necessarily correct conditional on the signal investors observe and on the model they use in forming expectations. If investors observe the better signal, given the true state, and use the true probability distributions in forming expectations, then their forecasts also are unconditionally correct. In subsequent sections, all references to correct or incorrect forecasts refer to unconditional accuracy.
Interestingly, the optimistic forecast can be used to construct bounds on the exit-decision date of an investor with conditionally correct forecasts. The reason stems from the difference between an investor with an optimistic forecast and one with a conditionally correct forecast. The latter recognizes that there is a date at which everyone else in the economy exits; the former does not. An investor with an optimistic forecast thus never exits sooner than one with a conditionally correct forecast. And a type-i investor with a conditionally correct forecast remains diversified at all dates t < τ ε i b g because, by equilibrium condition ii, he expects everyone of type i to do so. It follows that the portfolio reallocations at τ ε i b g+1 are due solely to beliefs about fundamentals, not to any coordination failure. When ε = 0, there is only one type of conditionally correct investor, so his exit-decision date is the same as that in an economy with identical investors with optimistic forecasts. That is, for a type-i investor who thinks ℘ = p with probability 1,
Thus, in subsequent sections, the optimistic forecast is used to find τ i 0 b g.
This completes the description of the economy. It remains to analyze rational and irrational
exuberance. This is done in the remainder of the paper by studying two special cases of the economy: one with strong fundamentals and rational investors, and one with weak fundamentals and irrational investors. For each case, bounds on the exit-decision date for each investor type are found, making use of the case ε = 0 and its associated exit-decision date τ p b g.
III. Rationality, Exuberance, and Apprehension
A special case of the economy described above is used in this section to study rational exuberance and apprehension. Specifically, the true state of the economy is assumed to be ω 1 , so that the economy's fundamentals truly are strong (℘ = 0), and investors are assumed to have rational expectations as commonly defined. That is, investors are assumed to optimize and to form expectations using the true distributions Pr ω i b g and Pr |
In this rational economy, the investors who observe signal x 1 believe Pr | ω 1 1 x b g = 1 − ε by Bayes' Rule, and thus for ε < 0.5 believe, correctly, that the true state is most likely ω 1 and that shocks are unlikely to be realized at date 0. Given Pr | For economies with ε > 0, no matter how small, the analysis is significantly more difficult because there are two types of investors in the economy, each forecasting the state, the presence of investors of other types, and the beliefs of those other types. Because a total collapse of the economy's financial structure occurs when the last group of investors reallocates their portfolios, it is easiest to start by examining the apprehensive investors-the ones who expect shocks to be realized at date 0. As stated above, the apprehensive investors (type 2) think that there is a fraction ε of the population of type 1. To make conditionally correct forecasts of the type 1s' behavior, the apprehensive investors use their own priors, but since their priors are common to all investors, their forecasts are accurate: they believe that the type 1s expect no shocks to be realized and thus to remain diversified at least as long as they themselves do. Each apprehensive investor also forecasts correctly that the other apprehensive investors all make the same forecasts that he makes and find it a best response to hold a diversified portfolio when they expect everyone else to do so. With these beliefs, the environment in which an apprehensive investor pictures himself is the same as that in
Lagunoff and Schreft when shocks are realized with probability p and investors think everyone else remains diversified at least as long as he does (the optimistic forecast). It follows that an apprehensive (type 2) investor's exit-decision date, denoted τ ε
Like their apprehensive counterparts, the exuberant type-1 investors accurately forecast the beliefs of the type 2s because they use the true and common prior Pr ω i b g. As a result, they anticipate the apprehensive investors deciding at date τ p b g to exit and initiating a contagion at τ p b g + 1. The best response for the exuberant investors is to decide to exit at some date τ ε
The date τ ε 
Intuitively, when ε is higher, type-1 investors assign lower probability to state ω 1 , with ℘ = 0, and they believe that a smaller fraction of the population expects that ℘ = 0. Thus, an increased presence of apprehensive investors in the economy does not reduce fragility.
A third, and striking, finding is that the financial collapse that occurs because type-1 investors decide at τ ε 1 R b g to exit is indistinguishable from the collapse that occurs in an economy with homogeneous beliefs and certainty that ℘ = ′ p for some ′ p . Formally:
That is, a financial crisis that looks as if it had been initiated by real shocks actually could have been caused solely by the presence of a small share of investors who were apprehensive-though rationally so-about the economy's prospects. Without knowledge of the true fundamentals, an observer cannot determine whether a crisis occurred because of less-than-pure rational exuberance in a fundamentally sound economy.
IV. Irrationality, Exuberance, and Apprehension
A second special case of the economy of Section II is suitable for the analysis of irrational exuberance and apprehension. In this variant, the true state of the economy is ω 2 , the state in which the fundamentals are poor (℘ = p ), and investors' expectations are formed irrationally in the following sense: investors optimize and know the true likelihoods (that is, they know that Pr | x i i ω b g = 1−ε and Pr |
, but they do not use the true priors over the ω i .
Instead, a type-i investor updates his beliefs using the subjective prior .
That is, a type-1 investor uses a pessimistic prior, one that assigns more probability weight to the worse state, ω 2 , while a type-2 investor uses an optimistic prior, assigning greater probability weight to state ω 1 . In addition, investors believe that their own priors are the ones used by all investors, and they do not recognize the dependence of their priors on the state.
Clearly, many subjective priors are consistent with investors forming expectations irrationally in some sense. The priors assumed here are used because they generate beliefs about the probability of the states ω i that are the exact opposite of those held by the rational agents of Section III. Specifically, given these priors, the application of Bayes' Rule yields the posteriors Pr | given that the true state is ω 2 , that a fraction 1 − ε of investors observes signal x 2 and so is of type 2. The type 2s believe, given their optimistic subjective priors, that the true state is ω 1 with probability 1 − ε and ω 2 with probability ε . Likewise, a fraction ε observes x 1 and is of type 1.
They pessimistically assign probability ε to state ω 1 and probability 1 − ε to state ω 2 . Thus, in this economy with irrational investors, it is the type 2s who end up with posterior beliefs that are unjustifiably exuberant and the type 1s who have posteriors that are apprehensive and relatively more correct, at least about the state.
The use of the subjective priors introduces an interesting complication into the analysis.
Since investors believe, incorrectly, that their subjective priors are the priors used by all investors, they make incorrect forecasts of both the distribution of investor types in the economy and the beliefs of investors not of their type. Specifically, in forecasting the beliefs of the type 2s, the pessimistic type-1 investors, who think the state is most likely ω 2 , use Bayes' Rule with their subjective prior, Pr
2 , and conclude that the type-2 investors assign probability ε ε ε 3 3 3 1 − + b g , which is less than ε for ε < 0.5, to state ω 1 . That is, the type 1s believe, incorrectly, that the type 2s think state ω 1 , with ℘ = 0, is even less likely than they themselves believe it to be, and thus that the type 2s are the most apprehensive investors in the economy. But given the known likelihoods Pr | x j i ω d i = ε and Pr | x i i ω b g = 1 − ε , the type 1s think their type is a minority of the population and that the type 2s are the majority. 10 In this, at least, they are correct, since the true state is ω 2 . The optimistic type 2s, who think the true state is ω 1 , use the same approach to forecasting the beliefs of the type-1 investors. They wrongly conclude 10 It can readily be verified that a type i investor assigns probability 2 1 ε ε − ( ) to other investors being of type i.
that the type 1s assign probability 1 1
b g b g , which exceeds 1−ε for ε < 0.5, to state ω 1 . As a result, the type 2s think the type 1s are the most exuberant investors in the economy. And they wrongly believe that the type 1s are in the majority. Every investor, then, incorrectly believes that his own type is the minority and that everyone else is at least as exuberant or apprehensive as he is.
Investors use these irrational forecasts in determining their strategies. The true apprehensive investors, the type 1s, think that shocks most likely are realized at date 0, but they also think that the type 2s assign even higher probability to such an outcome and believe themselves to be in the majority. The type 1s thus predict that the type 2s believe that the majority of the population thinks a contagious financial crisis to be very likely and decides at some date to exit. If, for example, ε = 1/k, which approaches zero as k approaches infinity, there is one type-1 investor in the economy.
This sole type 1 believes first that everyone else (the type 2s) thinks that virtually everyone is of type 2, and second, that the type 2s think ℘ = p > 0 is at least as likely as he thinks it is. 11 The type 1 also perceives type-2 investors as thinking that all investors continue to hold a diversified portfolio as long as their expected lifetime utility from doing so exceeds that from switching to the next-best alternative portfolio. But this is exactly what an investor in the Lagunoff and Schreft economy thinks when the probability of shocks is believed to be p . Consequently, the type-1 investor forecasts that the type 2s' exit-decision date is τ p b g ≥ 0. This is an ominous forecast for the type-1 investor because the exiting of the type 2s causes projects to fail at τ p b g + 1 in addition to those the type-1 investor expects to fail from the contagion induced by date-0 shocks. The best response for the type-1 investor in this environment is to choose an exit-decision date τ ε
In summary, although the type 1s correctly forecast which state is most likely, they incorrectly forecast the forecasts of the type 2s, and thus perceive the risks to their portfolios as greater than they are in actuality. That is, their prior about the state is pessimistic, but they end up even more pessimistic about the prospects for their portfolios because they incorrectly forecast the beliefs of others. Type-1 investors thus personify Chicken Little, thinking that the sky is falling and reacting accordingly, contributing to the economy's fragility by exiting at least as early as they would if they recognized the type 2s' true exuberance.
The exuberant type 2s do not fare any better in forecasting the type 1s' behavior. They think it unlikely that any shocks are realized at date 0, and they perceive the type 1s as viewing shock realizations as even less likely and thinking type 1s are in the majority. The type 2s therefore think that the type 1s are likely to continue to hold diversified portfolios at least as long as the type 2s.
Again, if, for example, ε = 1/k, then each type-2 investor believes incorrectly that he is the only type-2 investor, is virtually certain that no shocks hit at date 0, and thinks that everyone else in the economy is at least as certain that no shocks are realized. This is the economy of Lagunoff and
Schreft with a true probability of project failure of zero. In the limit, as k approaches ∞, the exitdecision date of the type 2s, denoted τ 2 1 I k b g, equals τ 0 b g, which is infinity. Thus, for any ε, τ ε
In summary, type-2 investors' prior about the state is optimistic, but they end up even more optimistic about the prospects for their portfolios because of their incorrect forecasts. Type-2 investors, then, are the quintessential Cockeyed Optimists, sustaining the economy's financial structure longer than they would if they recognized the type 1s' true apprehension. The following proposition formalizes these results: It follows that the economy is at least as fragile the greater is ε.
Furthermore, the irrational type-2 investors are not only irrationally exuberant; they are also more exuberant than the rational type-1 investors are in an economy in which the true state is ω 1 (i.e., the type-1 investors studied in Section III). This result arises because the irrationally exuberant type-2 investors misforecast by a large margin both the likelihood of the true state and the beliefs of the minority group (the type-1 investors). Because these type 2s believe the irrationally apprehensive type 1s to be the truly irrationally exuberant investors in the economy, the type 2s are more irrationally exuberant than they would be otherwise. Thus, irrational type-2 investors exit later than rational type-1 investors, which means that the economy with irrational exuberance is less fragile than that with rational exuberance, given ε. Similarly, the irrationally apprehensive type-1 investors are even more apprehensive than the rationally apprehensive type-2 investors. The following proposition formally states these results. 
V. Implications for Policy
The preceding sections examine economies with particular combinations of the state and beliefs for the purpose of characterizing rational and irrational exuberance. Collectively, the results yield a ranking of exit-decision dates:
Since these dates are independent of the true state, they can be applied to more general economies that consist of both rational and irrational, type-1 and type-2 investors.
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By using these exit-decision dates, investors maximize their expected lifetime utility, given the signal they observe about the state and their priors. In some sense, then, they are as well off as . If investors discover the true state after the collapse is over, the irrational ones realize that no shocks were realized and regret having exited preemptively.
Even if investors never discover the true state, there will always be some who regret their decisions. They are the ones who incur losses from contagion before their scheduled exit date.
Depending on the realization of shocks and the initial chain structure, there could be many such investors, or just a few. These investors will look to policymakers for remedies and for assurances that such a crisis will not occur again. Of course, no such assurances can be given because shocks and beliefs are exogenous and the chain structure is unknown, but there are some policy options.
In the short term, policymakers are limited to trying to stem any ongoing contagion. A commonly used approach is for some institution to serve as a lender of last resort who lends funds immediately after shocks are realized to prevent additional losses. In the economy of Section II, such an institution could be modeled as being known to and able to provide information to all investors, but having no greater knowledge of the economy than anyone else (i.e., it does not know the chain structure or realization of shocks). It could announce that it stands ready to extend emergency credit and could raise resources to fund its activities either by creating funds (e.g., issuing a fiat currency) or taxing the return on projects. Agents would reveal themselves to the lender of last resort to obtain credit. Since investors are the only agents in the economy, they are the ones to whom any loans must go. This by itself makes the policy problematic. The reason is that loans must go to investors who actually incur losses and, by equilibrium condition iv, are about to reallocate their portfolios, initiating the first round of contagion. But portfolios are private information, so all investors, whether or not they have incurred losses, have an incentive to request loans under such a policy, and policymakers have no way to identify the legitimate borrowers. The policy also is ineffective because at best it postpones the contagion for two periods. 14 This stems 14 It is instructive to see why lending to investors does not work here because the reason highlights the role portfolio linkages play in generating contagion. Someone who incurs losses on both investments because of shocks, and thus borrows $2, cannot reinvest in his formerly held projects because they are no longer operative. He instead must put the funds into a safe portfolio, which means he either consumes them immediately or consumes $1 and puts $1 in the safe asset for one period. An investor who only loses $1 from shocks still has a project in which he can reinvest. In the bestcase scenario for reducing contagion, he invests the $1 he borrows plus the remaining dollar of his endowment into the from the simplicity of the model and the nature of the chain structure.
A lender of last resort conceivably could end contagion, at least on average, by making loans to projects. This policy could be used if the model is modified by adding agents who operate projects and can reveal themselves if their projects do not receive sufficient funding to operate.
There typically is a moral-hazard problem, however, in making loans to such agents, so it is unclear whether the policy can improve welfare on net.
The model also suggests some longer-term measures that a lender of last resort or government entity can take to reduce the likelihood of contagion. For example, monitoring lenders'
portfolios provides information about the economy's linkages that a lender of last resort can use to identify projects at risk of receiving insufficient funding and to coordinate a response among investors. The supervision of banks by governmental regulatory organizations is an example of a policy that achieves this end. A second example is policies that result in greater diversification and thus increase the number of shock-induced project failures needed to initiate a crisis. An implementation of such a policy in the United States is the restriction that allows money-market mutual funds to hold only a limited share of their portfolios in the commercial paper of a single issuer. These types of long-term measures can result in a stronger, more resilient chain structure and thus can reduce the likelihood and severity of contagious financial crises.
For such policies to be effective, however, they must be adopted by an entity with authority regarding all possible portfolio linkages because all linkages contribute to an economy's fragility.
Thus, if the model is taken to be one of a small closed economy with strict capital controls, then the entity could be a domestic institution. For open economies with global linkages, fighting contagion requires an organization of international scope.
Appendix A
This appendix presents the expected lifetime utilities associated with an investor's one project that is left in his portfolio. But his former coinvestor also reinvests either $1 or $2. As a result, his pre-tax return is at most 4 3 R . Given the bounds on R , the tax rate, and equilibrium condition iv, he at best only consumes his interest and reinvests $1 for one additional period. Thus, a policy of extending emergency credit to investors who incurred losses at most postpones the contagion for a period or two.
continuing to hold diversified portfolios or deviating to another portfolio in the dynamic recursive game that begins after the shocks are realized. As explained in Section II-C, the bounds on the exitdecision dates τ ε i b g are the exit-decision dates from an economy with investors who make optimistic forecasts and are homogeneous (ε = 0) and where the true probability of shocks ℘ is believed to be p. That economy is the one described in Lagunoff and Schreft. Hence, the expected utilities for all t < τ ε i b g here are those from Lagunoff and Schreft, who provide a thorough derivation in their Appendix A. 15 In this model, the expected lifetime utility from any portfolio must depend on both the probabilities of being in the various chains and the expected utilities associated with those chains. forecast that everyone remains diversified who has not incurred a loss. This difference is immaterial, however, because the focus here is only on the date at which investors exit, not on which portfolio they switch to at that date. 16 The probabilities are unchanged if they are calculated after returns are realized at date t − 1, when the investor makes his consumption-investment decision. g, where n = r + 2(t−1).
These probabilities can be normalized by dividing them by Λ t , the total probability weight attached to all r-link chains at date t, where . That is, since the later exit of type-2 investors does not affect type-1 investors at the earlier date at which the type-1 investors exit, type-1 investors do not exit any later if they believe that there only exist type-1 investors.
In summary, it has been shown that τ ε τ ε τ ε τ ε 
But it is also the case that, by the Lemma, τ ε τ 
